T1213 - Data from Information Repositories#
Adversaries may leverage information repositories to mine valuable information. Information repositories are tools that allow for storage of information, typically to facilitate collaboration or information sharing between users, and can store a wide variety of data that may aid adversaries in further objectives, or direct access to the target information. Adversaries may also abuse external sharing features to share sensitive documents with recipients outside of the organization.
The following is a brief list of example information that may hold potential value to an adversary and may also be found on an information repository:
Policies, procedures, and standards
Physical / logical network diagrams
System architecture diagrams
Technical system documentation
Testing / development credentials
Work / project schedules
Source code snippets
Links to network shares and other internal resources
Information stored in a repository may vary based on the specific instance or environment. Specific common information repositories include web-based platforms such as Sharepoint and Confluence, specific services such as Code Repositories, IaaS databases, enterprise databases, and other storage infrastructure such as SQL Server.
Atomic Tests:#
Currently, no tests are available for this technique.
Detection#
As information repositories generally have a considerably large user base, detection of malicious use can be non-trivial. At minimum, access to information repositories performed by privileged users (for example, Active Directory Domain, Enterprise, or Schema Administrators) should be closely monitored and alerted upon, as these types of accounts should generally not be used to access information repositories. If the capability exists, it may be of value to monitor and alert on users that are retrieving and viewing a large number of documents and pages; this behavior may be indicative of programmatic means being used to retrieve all data within the repository. In environments with high-maturity, it may be possible to leverage User-Behavioral Analytics (UBA) platforms to detect and alert on user based anomalies.
The user access logging within Microsoft’s SharePoint can be configured to report access to certain pages and documents. (Citation: Microsoft SharePoint Logging) Sharepoint audit logging can also be configured to report when a user shares a resource. (Citation: Sharepoint Sharing Events) The user access logging within Atlassian’s Confluence can also be configured to report access to certain pages and documents through AccessLogFilter. (Citation: Atlassian Confluence Logging) Additional log storage and analysis infrastructure will likely be required for more robust detection capabilities.
Shield Active Defense#
Pocket Litter#
Place data on a system to reinforce the legitimacy of the system or user.
Pocket Litter is data placed on a system to convince an adversary that the system and users are real. Pocket litter includes documents, registry entries, log history, browsing history, connection history, and other user data that one would expect to exist on a user’s computer. This content may overlap with Decoy Content, however Pocket Litter covers aspects beyond just content (e.g.: Installed Applications, source code, clutter on a system, etc.).
Opportunity#
In an adversary engagement scenario, there is an opportunity to seed content to influence an adversary’s behaviors, test their interest in specific topics, or add legitimacy to a system or environment.
Use Case#
A defender can stage a variety of pocket litter files on an attached storage space. This data may include topics that align to a persona, topics an adversary is interested in, etc.
Procedures#
When staging a decoy system and user account, populate a user’s folders and web history to make it look realistic to an adversary. Stage a USB device with documents on a specific topic in order to see if they are exfiltrated by an adversary.